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Chapter

Morgentaler
and Beyond:
Abortion,
Reproduction,
and the
Courts

Shelley A.M .Gavigan

Feminism, Law, and the State
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Canadian feminist pro-choice
movement identified the state and especially the law as its principal
adversaries, calling for decriminalization of abortion and demanding
that the state 'keep its laws off women's bodies'. Parliament never
acceded, and ultimately it was left to litigation in the courts, in particular criminal prosecution and a Charter challenge, to detern1ine
the status of the Canadian abortion law. The celebrated Morgentaler1 victory in the Supreme Court of Canada led to a partial
realignment of feminist posture vis-a-vis the law, however. The critique of the legal system became more selective: juries were
applauded, the Supreme Court became pref erred over certain
provincial Courts of A ppeal {notably those of Ontario and Quebec),
and the call for 'No New Law' was amended to 'No New Criminal
Law'. As astute students of Canadian politics, Canad ian feminists
and pro-choice activists alike realized that decriminalization alone
did not guarantee women's access to abortion. While the Criminal
Code continued to be resisted, the Canada Health Act, the bedrock
of Canada's medicare system, came to. be seen as having a different
legal complexion. Thus, feminists in Canada developed a more
refined appreciation of the distinction and relationship between
coercive and other forms of law.
This chapter examines the legal legacy of the M orgentaler decision, and the challenges it poses for feminist analysis of and engagement with law. The Supreme Court's decision, profound as it was,
did not create a right to abortion for Canadian women, nor did it
offer any resolution of the abortion issue. While feminists were galvanized to resist any n ew law, the problem of how to ensure
women's access to medically insured abortions loomed larger than
ever before. Several provincial governments were equally moved to
restrict both doctors and women, while the medical profession likewise resisted any new criminal law which might put its members at
risk of either criminal prosecution or harassment.
Several of these protagonists found themselves in curious positions in their relationship to the law. While Henry Morgentaler continued to be prosecuted by the Crown in Nova Scotia, he himself
applied to the Court when the New Bru nswick government refused
to pay his fees for abortion services rendered to New Bru nswick
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women at his Montreal clinic. While the Right to Life
movement continued to press for new foetal rights and men's
rights, several of its supporters, participants in Operation Rescue
(characterized by one author as 'Operation Oppress You')2 found
themselves on the other side of the law, prosecuted and convicted
for their defiance of court orders to stay away from abortion
clinics.3 It is my argument that no groups found themselves in a
more contradictory position vis-a-vis Canadian law and the
Canadian state than did feminists and their allies who found
themselves enjoying an unprecedented series of legal victories.
The implications of a feminist turn to law to challenge power and
to create new rights claims have been carefully and critically interrogated by left and feminist scholars alike.4 British feminist Carol
Smart, noting that 'it is almost as .hard to be against rights as it is
to be against virtue',5 urges feminists to be wary of the appeal of
the rhetoric and legal practice of 'rights'. Smart argues that feminists have ceded .too much to law at the expense of rn ore important
alternative extra-legal strategies, and they now find themselves in a
difficul t contradiction: 'the appeal to law on the basis of basic
rights was no less than an appeal to the state to re-order power relations.'6 Whet her in the areas of sexual assault, child custody or
reproductive freedoms, Smart argues that. law transforms feminism's claims and issues, and imposes new and superior redefinitions; and it is 'this power to define [that] is part of the power of
law . . .'.7 She u rges feminists to 'discourage a resort to law as if it
holds the key to unlock women's oppression', to 'de-centre law
wherever this is feasible' and thereby to resist 'the move towards
more law and the creeping hegemony of the legal order'.6
Yet, Smart draws back from analysing the state as a site of
women 's subordination and feminist struggle. While she illuminates the uneven and refracted relation of law to women and argues
against imprecise and simplistic conceptual frameworks such as
'power as commodity', 'law as tool', it is clear that she also regards
'the state' as analytically vacuous and anachronistic: 'a concept like
the state is so imprecise and misleadingly implies a monolithic
unity of interests and regimes. . . '.9
The cogency as well as the limits of Carol Smart 's argu ment
have begun to be illustrated in the Canadian context as feminists
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grapple with the weaknesses, per haps even false promise, of the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 10 Judy Fudge argues that by
advancing women 's equality claims through Charter litigation, fen1inists have neglected both the nature of the state's contribution to
the main tenance of women 's subordination and the significance of
the particular form of the public/private split entrenched in the
Charter. She illustrates that the inequalities and despotism of the
private sphere remain beyond the scrutiny of the Charter, irrespective of whether one's concept of the private realm includes the
family as well as the market. She cites, for example, the state's legislatively expressed commitment to the primacy of 'private' responsibility for spousal or child support, which is nothing less than a
commitmen t to state-enforced patriarchal relations. In the same
way some feminists do, the state wants men to be responsible for
children, to be accountable, and most importa ntly, to pay. Bu t, in
her view, '[i]t is impossible to regard a [ju dicial) decision that rein·
forces women's econom ic dependency upon men by privatizing the
obligation for support as a progressive victory.'11
This chapter illustrates that a concern with the law-state relation
is still appropriate, indeed imperative. Smart reminds us that the
state is often asserted t o be, and less often illustrated as, a
leviathan-like source of power, for men or capital or both. Rather
than ignoring it because of these analytic problems, however, it is
still better to insist upon an analysis of the law-state relation. This
is particularly so in the Canadian context because the abortion
issue cannot be understood as separate ftom the state, its form, its
division of powers,12 its social policies and coercive practices, and
the law, both legislative and adjudicative.
To detach the law from the state is effectively to participate in
efforts to depoliticize the former. Indeed, as this book argues, the
medicali7Ation of abortion, the use of criminal prosecution and the
courts, the 'free vote' in Parliamen t, have all been aspects of the
state's strategy to depoliticize both abortion struggles and abortion
law. Ferninists n1ust both recognize this strategy and work with con·
ceptual tools that allow it to be exposed and thereby analyzed. The
specificity of both state and law need to be acknowledged. Thus,
withou t collapsing law into the state, or the state into law, it is necessary to examine each in relation to the other.
Even ostensibly private disputes, such as those involving the
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women and men in the abortion injunction cases,13 illustrate the
importance of the posture and action of the state vis-a-vis abortion.
Such cases demonstrate how recriminalization explicitly defines the
interest of the Canadian state in abortion and, implicitly, defines
an interest of men who, regarding themselves sufficiently affected,
attempt to intervene to ensure compliance with the law. 14 Beyond
the issue of criminalization are state decisions about whether or not
to provide medicare funds for 'non-therapeuti c' abortions, 15 to permit the establishment of free-standing abortion clinics, 16 and oth·
erwise to create conditions of meaningful access.17 The resolution
of the abortion issue is more likely to be determined by political
struggle than by legal right. In this the role played by the state is
of central importance.
An analysis of this role and the nature of the law-state relation is
aided by the concept of ideology, which illuminates the contradictory nature of law. Understanding the significance of law as a site
of ideological struggle permits a reconcilation of the contradictory
experiences and assessments of pro·life and pro-choice legal challenges. Therefore, this chapter proceeds from the proposition that
law within Western capitalism is principally, but not exclusively, an
ideological form.18 It sets normative stand ards and informs, shapes,
and constrains the content of collective and conventional thinking
about social structure and the possibilities and necessity for change,
an d it is simultaneously informed by these conventional ideas and
beliefs abou t social relations. 19 Not simply nor even accurately characterized as a 'reflection' of society, or its 'ham1ner ', the law (includ·
ing its agents-lawyers, legislators, and jud ges) is both a product
of and reproducer of the existing social order.20
Conceptualizing law and ideology assists us in analysing the current abortion debates, as well as demonstrating the extent to which
the law is a site of struggle. The sectio.ns which follow describe the
ways in which the pro-life moven1ent has mad e claims ·1•1ith increasing authority that 'abortion is murder' when this is not, and has
never been, the definition provided in Canadian criminal law. They
also describe how the startlingly novel claim that the foetus is a person has gained popular currency, notwithstanding the consistent
position in law that a live birth is a prerequisite for personhood.
Ideologies become dominant not necessarily t hroug h law, and
indeed occasionally in opposition to la,v, but emergent as well as
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dominan t ideologies may nonetheless be imported or incorporated
into law. Interestingly, the strongest weapon in the anti-choice
rights arsenal in Canada has not yet proven to be a legal one.
After reviewing the M orgentaler decision in detail, we will examine related litigation, including the pro-choice and pro-life cases, the
fathers' rights cases, and cases involving the provincial clawbacks of
M orgentaler and med icare. Notwithstanding the many legal defeats
experienced by anti-choice advocates, and the recent spate of legal
victories achieved by pro-choice advocates, the extra-legal cultural
struggle that is currently being waged may prove to be the decisive
one.21 To argue that both the law and the state are sites of struggle
ought not to lead to the position that they are inevitable, necessary,
or exclusive sites; the legal victories are never conclusive. In other
words, while the law cannot he ignored, it should not mesmerize
those endeavouring to achieve social change.

From Victory to Defeat to Victory: 1Horgentaler in the Courts
Although there was unevenness in levels of feminist activity in the
years following the 1969 amend ments to the Criminal Code, Canadian feminist and pro-choice activists consistently identified the
ineq uality created by the abortion law and called for decriminalization.22 They voted with their feet in the streets, in hundreds of
demonstrations and several blustery {arch 8 International Women's
Day marches. The cold feet really belonged, however, to male
elected representatives in Parliament. For all their lobbying efforts,
political activity, careful analyses and docume.nted inequality, Canadian women met the stony intransigence of a federal government
ostensibly committed to equality in its legislation, yet lacking the
political will to move on this important issue.
In the early 1980s, the wo1nen's movement paid increasing attention to the abortion issue. Feminists were frustrated by their failed
efforts to have abortion decriminalized, and were foiled in their
atte1npts to work within the existing law.23 Activists in English
Canada looked to the successful free-standing clinic experience in
Quebec and decided to extend the Quebec experiment to other
commun ities, specifically Winnipeg and Toronto. In Toronto, the
Committee for the Establishment of Abortion Clinics was formed
by feminist and pro-choice activists. The Committee sought and
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received the support of Henry Morgentaler and two other doctors,
and the Morgentaler Clinic on Harbord Street in Toronto was
opened. A public campaign was launched, and the challenge to the
federal law was explicit and direct.
As in the 1970s in Quebec, a raid on a Morgentaler clinic resulted
in criminal charges. And, once again, following a prolonged but
u nsuccessful pretrial motion to quash the indictments against
them,24 Dr Morgentaler and his two colleagues, Ors Leslie Smoling
and Robert Scott, were acquitted by yet another jury. Once again, at
the hands of a Court of Appeal, the verdict was set aside;a ne'v trial
was ordered .25 The Ontario Court of Appeal was not moved by
defence arguments that the Charter of Rights had altered in a significant way the fabric of the law. In fact, the Court of Appeal comforted itself with the knowledge that abortion had long been a
criminal offence and offered this analysis of the right to life, liberty,
and security of the person under section 7 of the Charter:
Some rights have their basis in common law or statute law.
Some are so deeply rooted in our traditions and'vay of life as to
be fundamental and could be classified as part of life, lib·
erty and security of the person. The right to choose one's
partner in marriage, and the decision whether or not to have
children, would fall in this category . . .

We agree with Parker A.C.J.H.C. in the court below that,
bearing in mind the statutory prohibition against abortion in
Canada which has existed for 100 years, it could not be said
that there is a right to procure an abortion so deeply rooted in
our tradi tions and way of life as to be fundamental.26
The Ontario Cou rt of Appeal also h eld t hat Dr Morgentaler's
understanding of the law relating to the defence of necessity was
'misconceived'. The Court, clearly offended by the doctors' scrupulous advance preparation to rely upon this defence, held :
Taking the most favourable view of the ev iden ce for the
defence, the respondents were dissatisfied with the present law
relating to abortions in Canada.27
It was left to Morgen taler to proceed with an appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada and to argue in that court that the abortion
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provisions of the Criminal Code violated the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, in particular section 7, which provides:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fun damen tal justice.
Alt hough the named appellants before the Supreme Court were
Drs Morgentaler, Smoling and Scott, the case was argued in the
name of women whose access to abortion, including therapeutic
abortion, was inhibited by the operation of the provisions of section
251. Clearly, the voluminous evidence led at trial by the doctors
convinced the majority of the Court that the procedure enunciated
in section 251was, in the words of the Chief Justice, •manifestly
unfai r'.28 While Justice Mcintyre in dissent insisted that any problems identified with the abortion law were caused by 'external'
forces, specifically 'a general demand for abortion irrespective of
the provisions of section 251',29 Dickson held that 'many of the
most serious problems with . . . section 251 are crf.'-ated by the procedural and adnlinistrative requirements established in the law'.30
Although the heart of Dickson's ju dgment centred upon the 'manifest unfairness' of the procedures, the lack of any definition of
health, and the inherent delays in the 1969 amendments, his judg e·
ment had some unequivocal resonances for women:
Forcing a woman, by threat of criminal sanctipn, to carry a
foetus to term unless she meets certain criteria unrelated to
her own priorities and aspirations, is a profound interference
with a woman's body and thus a violation of her security of
the person.31
Despite this apparently strong criticism of compulsory pregnancy, it is important to remember that Dickson would have upheld
the legislation had its procedures complied with the principles of
fu ndamental justice; the fact of criminalizat ion per se was not
rejected. Beyond this, Dickson, as all members of the Court, contemplated that state protection of 'foetal interests' 'might well he
deserving of court protection'32 und er section 1of the Char ter
which: '. • . guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject
only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as car1 be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society'.

124

In other words, provided that restrictive abortion legislation contained a standard or procedure that was fair and not arbitrary, Dickson might well uphold it in the name of state protection of the foetus.
Madam Justice Wilson's ju dgement focused less on procedural
unfairness which might be remedied. Unlike her brothers on the
bench, Wilson rested her decision on the right to liberty within section 7, and insisted that the right to ind ividual liberty is 'inextri·
cably tied to the concept of human dignity',33 which for Wilson
included the right to make fundamental personal decisions rithin
a sphere of personal autonomy:
The right to reproduce or not to reproduce which is in issue
in this case is one such right and is properly perceived as an
integral part of modern woman's struggle to assert her dignity
and worth as a hu man bei ng (emphasis in original).34
Wilson also held that a woman's security of the person was violated by section 251. In particular, the requirement of a therapeutic abortion committee meant that:
She is the passive recipient of a decision made by others as to
whether her body is to he used to nurture a new life. Can
there be anything that comports less with h uman dignity and
self-respect?35
Wilson's 'sphere of personal autonomy' did not invol ve an atomized libertarianism . She situated her individual 'woma n' wi thin
her context36 while insisting that within t his social or collective
context, the ind ividual (pregnant woman) had to be able to make
decisions which might well defy the imaginative capacities of
(non-pregnant) men. Nonetheless, Wilson too contemplated that,
as in Roe v Wfide, a wornan's right of access to abortion was not
to he absolute:
At some point the legitimate state interests in the protection
of health, proper medical standards, and pre-natal life would
justify its qualification.37
For Wilson, section 1 of the Charter would authorize 'reasonable
limits to he put upon the woman's right':38
In the early stages the woman's autonomy would be absolute;
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her decision, reached in consultation with her physician not to
carry the foetus to term would be conclusive. 'f he state would
have no business inquiring into her reasons. The precise point
in the development of the foetus at which the state's interest
in its protection becomes 'compelling' I leave to the informed
judgement of the legislature which is in a position to receive
guidance on the subject from all the relevant disciplines. It
seems to me, however, that it might fall somewher e in the second trimester.39
As for the rest of the bench, both Beetz J. (writing with the majority) and Mcintyre J.(in dissent) held that protection of the foetus
was the primary purpose of the abortion legislation; Beetz found
the procedural problems in section 251 fatal. Mcintyre, the only
judg e to use the language of the pro-life movement, would have
upheld the legislation design ed to protect the interests of the
u nborn child:
There has always been a clear recognition of a public interest
in the protection of the unborn and there has been no indication of any general acceptance of the concept of abortion at
will in our society.w
In the end, section 251 was struck down.
Although few people anticipated complete success with the Charter challenge, it is clear in retrospect that it was an all-or-nothing
proposition. In an oddly dialectical way, the seed for this successful assault on the abortion section had been sown in Justice Dickson's own analysis of it as 'a comprehensive code . . ., u nitary and
complete within itself in his 1976 judgement which upheld Dr
Morgentaler's conviction in the first rou nd .41
The result was, of course, an historic decision in which the
Supreme Court of Canada struck down in its entirety section 251.
It mark ed the cu lmination of two decades of hard-fough t feminist
struggle in which the legal victories had been few and the political victories even fewer.42 However, it quickly became clear that
this, like many victories, particularly legal victories, was fragile,
incomplete and contradictory.1'he victory \Vas fragile because t he
federal government, though bruised, attempted for two years to
recriminalize abortion. Threats, and in some cases action; by
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provincial governments responsible for hospitals, to refuse or limit
funding for abortions in the absence of a therapeutic exception in
the Criminal Code further attested to the fragility.43 It was an
incomplete victory because th.e unequivocal commitmen t of all the
Supreme Court judg es to 'foetal interests' or the 'state's interest
in the foetus' invited Parliament to limit women's access to abortion (and indeed other med ical procedures) in the later stages of
pregnancy and opened the door to other legislative proposals,
which purported to can•e out a 'specific' foetal interest, if not full
legal persona lity.44
Finally, the victory was also contradictory in that the Court
reinforced the notion that abortion is a .medical matter. Contradictions abound in this maintenance of a medicalized conceptio n of
abortion . On the one hand , Canadian feminists and pro-choice
activists have articulated a long-standing critique of the implications of denoting of abortion as a medical or therapeutic matter.4.5
Yet, on the other hand, in very important and paradoxical ways the
continued denotation of abortion as a health matter has been sig·
nificant in the Canadian context. Health care in Canada has come
to he regarded as a social right, enshrined in a comprehensive and
fully funded health care system based upon principles of accessibility and un iversal ity.46 In the years following the Supreme
Court's decision, the issue of women's right of access to health care
has fuelled the pro-choice n1ovemen t. Indeed, the fragility of
women' s access to abortio.n has helped to illustrate the more gen·
eral fragility of med icare in Canada.
By focusing on these contradictions we can better understand the
situation Canadian w omen face. Obviously, the language of the
Morgentaler judgements of the majority was a ringing restatement
of an individ ual right to life, liberty, and security of the person and
is thus consistent with the emphasis on abortion as a private and
individual matter.47 While this reflects the language of lawyers and
judges, it has not been the character ization of Canadian pro-choice
and feminist activists, who have consistently framed abortion as an
issue of equality and access. Access to abortion by Canadian
women should not be as vulnerable to the kind of legislative and
judicial erosion as in the United States, where the US Supreme
Court began to undermine Roe v W&de49 in a series of decisions
which upheld federal provisions restricting the expenditure of
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Med icaid funds for all but medically necessary abortions, t here·
by and thereafter deprivin g poor American women access to
medically insured abortions .50 ln 1989, the US Supreme Court
upheld Missouri legislation w hich prohibited pu b]icly funded
health-care centres and pu blic employees from providing abortion
services.51 The Canadian politi cal and social context is different in
an important respect by virtue of the comprehensive public healthcare system. And so in Canada we are in the rather paradoxical
position of r1ow having to insist that abortion is a health-care matter, in order to ensure equal access and availability of pu blicly
funded abortions.

Right to life versus the Law
The 1969 abortion law was also assailed by the right to life movement who insisted that even the limited therapeutic provisions of
the Criminal Code went too far. The thrust of their campaign, legal
and otherwise, has been to limit women's access to legal abortion,
to advocate striking down the therapeutic abortion provisions, to
co.nstru ct and advance new rights for m en ( qu,a h usban ds and
fathers) and for the foetus, and to threaten and harass everyone
involved in the delivery of abortion services. These challenges to
Canadian abortion law are as important as the pro-choice challenges have been.
One important early extra-legal tactic of the right to life inovement was to exert constant, concerted pressure on hospitals to dismantle their Therapeutic Abortion Committees. Paradoxically, a
hospital's decision to dismantle its committee (often after a struggle for control of the cornposition of the hospital board) sometimes became a source of tension between hospital boards and
doctors. Doctors were able to force the reinstatement of abortion
com n1ittees by refusing to sit on other hospital committees. The
outcome in at least one such case, however, was the appointment. by
a hospital board of a new committee with 'conservative' views on
abortion.52 Moreover, during a doctors' strike in Ontario in the fall
of 1986 (provoked by the proh ibition of extra-billing in the medicare system) one of the first services affected was the Therapeutic
Abortion Commi ttee.53 This experience again demonstrated the
political nature of the therapeutic abortion process and the tenuous
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status of women's access to legal abortion.
The most tenacious legal challenge undertaken by the anti-choice
m ovement was to be found in the Borowsk i case. In 1981, the
Supreme Court of Canada granted standing to long-time pro-life
activist Joseph Borowski to bring an action challenging the validity
of the therapeutic abortion amendments to the Criminal Code.
Speaking for the majority of the Supreme Court, Martland J. held
that Borowski did not have to establish that he was directly affected
hy the abortion legislation in order to bring his legal challenge
because he met a second test: 'he has a genuine interest as a citizen
in the validity of the legislation and . . . there is no other reasonable manner in which the issue may be brought before the court.'54>
With the entrench men t of the Charter of Right s, Borowski
amended his action to argue that the therapeutic abortion amendments were unconstitutional un der sections 7 and 15, violating a
foetus' right to life and equality.
He was unsuccessful at trial.55 Moreover, in the spring of 1987,
the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal, holding
th at a foetus is not an 'everyone' entitled to the protection of section 7 or section 15 of the Charter. 56 Because the Morgentaler
appeal was heard by the Supreme Court before the Borowski
appeal, the decision in the former sealed the fate of the latter.
Once the legislation he undertook to chal1enge had been struck
down by the Su preme Court in J\forgentaler, Mr Borowski's own
appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed as moot.57
The legal argument advanced by Borowski and others for foetal
personhoo d goes thus: Protective mechanisms available to the
unborn which crystallize at birth are already recognized by law.
There is no logical reason why legal personality and the rights
which flow therefrom should not be concomitant in time.58 The
medical and health needs of a foetus are analogous to and continuous of those of a child; thus, the child and the foetus should be considered juridical persons in the same sense and for the same
reasons.59 While any 'right to property' thus far afforded to the foetus is and has been a contingent right 60-contingent on live birth
-this requirem ent is regard ed as anachronistic.61 Indeed, Joe
Borowski's counsel insisted he was arguing the new 'Persons Case'
- a reference to the Persons case of 1930 which extended women's
political rights.62

129

Foetal Personhood : The I deology of Foetal Rights
Feminists across a range of disciplines63 have noted the many and
contradictory ways that the new visibility of the foetus has rendered
pregnant women invisible, likened them to 'ambulatory chalices'64
or flower pots<» and, less benignly, seen them as the principal adversaries of the foetus. Advocates of legal recognition of foetal personhood such as the American 1ega1 academic John Robertson66 and
Canadian law ref orm consultant Ed ward Keyserlingk 67 have turned
their minds to a whole panoply of forms and degrees of maternal
misconduct.In his assertion that 'mothers are arguably those wit h
the most serious and extensive duties and obligations toward the
unborn, and therefore the likeliest class of defendant',68 Keyserlingk
clearly regards pregnant women as the likeliest adversaries and
perpetrators of 'foetal neglect'.
The current characterization of hostility and antagonism betv•een
pregnan t women and foetuses is one which has been carefuUy con·
structed. In right-to-life legal arguments and factums, in literatu re
(legal and otherwise) and films, the pregnant woman is increasingly
put in the position of adversary to her own pregnancy either by presenting a 'hostile environment' for foetal development or by actively
refusing medically proposed intervention.69 Clearly, upon closer
analysis, the conflict is not one between maternal and foetal rights,?()
but rather between women and self-appointed curators of the foetus or guardians of 'foetal interests'.
The ubiquitous presence of the foetus in the abortion debate is
of rather recent provenance ; the earlier medical and legal literature
and case law having focused on the sexual immorality which gave
rise to abortion rather than the value of embryonic life.71 Now it
seems, the foetus itself has become the apparent target of the
engagement, our culture having 'discovered' what women have long
kno\vn: babies do not come fron1 h ospitals; they are 'with us'
throughout 'their' pregnancy. Moreover, prior to its birth the foetus
is already the new kid on the block. Foetal personhood advocates
emphasize the 'biological' unity of the 'pre-born' and 'bom'72 and
de-emphasize the biological unity of woman and foetus.
Feminists both acknowledge the fundamental unity of woman
and foetus and insist that the relationship is not 'symmetrical'.73
Indeed, feminist insistence upon pregnancy as a 'relationship'74

130

between a pregnant woman and a foetus is as significant as the
insight that this relationship is neither symmetrical nor inherently
antagonistic. Feminists are thus currently engaged in a concerted
struggle to resist the emerging if not yet prevailing image of preg·
nant women as menacing vessels, an image offensive to the integrity
and moral agency of pregnant women. But feminists have also had
to contend with the new invisibility of pregnant'vomen in this cam·
paign; witness Edward Keyserlingk:

In most respect s but one, the transfer from the protections of
the womb to the protection of the crib and nursery, there is
unbroken continuity between the u n bor n and the child .
(emphasis added)75
Has the law similarly been rendered invisible, an empty vessel or
an enem y alien, by the various contestants? Certainly, advocates for
the recognition of legal personhood for the foetus have reason to
feel that they have received a chilly reception in Canadian courts. In
the Sullivan and LeM'ay case,76 involving two lay midwives who
had been charged with criminal negligence in the death of the foe·
tus during delivery, the Court restated the axiomatic position that
prior to live birth, the foetus is not a human being for the purpose
of the Criminal Code. In the father's rights' cases of Daigle v
Tremblay 71 and M urphy v Dod d 18 both 'potential fathers' and foe·
tuses ultimately had to yield to the rights of the wornen.
While acknowledging the Canadian legal victories which have given
rise to pro-life chagrin, feminist advocates and scholars need to be
attentive to the various ways in which the foetal personhood campaign
has been waged extra-legally, that is, culturally and politically. Here
the ideological dimensions of the matter are particularly striking.
Despite the claim that the foetus is the named object of their attention, it is clear that the real objects of the foetal personhood campaign are women.79 Foetal personhood has implications for all women;
all pregnant women experience some form of surveillance, but it is
the poor who are most v ulnerable to the 'pregnancy police'.80
The new foetal imagery is not one-dimensional, however. Indeed,
two powerful if ontradictory images of the foetus have emerged as
part of what Rosalind Petchesky has characterized as a strategy to
make foetal personhood a self-fulfilling prophecy by making the
foetus a public presence in a visually oriented culture:81 the tiny,
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helpless, and innocen t unborn child and the active, virtuall y
autonomous foetus trapped in its mother's womb, begrudgingly
serving a nine-month sentence of confinement. Petchesky argues
that our collective understanding of the foetus has been in large
measure constructed by the visual images presented and insisted
upon by pro-J ife advocates.
The potential cultural and political successes of the foetal rights
movement, then, lie in its ability to both capture the imagination
and tap the anxiety of people who are receptive to the notion that
pregnant women are capable of extreme acts of selfishness and
irresponsibility. The foetus is presented as helpless and vulnerable,
the most innocent of innocent victims. Again, what is striking is
that this campaign has been so successful without significant support in Canadian law for its fundamenta l underlying premise: that
the foetus is a person with legal rights.
A window on this issue presents itself in part in the child welfare
cases in Canada and the forced obstetrical treatment cases82 in the
United States. A small hut significant body of case law to date
reveals83 some judicial sympathy for the proposition that for the purposes of child-welfare legislation, a child is deemed to include the
unborn. 84 Jn both Canada and the United States it is clear that the
women who are feeling the coercive edge of foetal attraction are poor
women, women on welfare who have a 'history' with either welfare or
child welfare authorities or both. Poor women,.homeless women, and
mentally ill women have supplanted the 'lewd' women who vexed previous generations of lawmakers and law enforcers. And the net will
widen if Edward Keyserlingk's view-that those who pose the greatest threat to foetuses are their pregnant mothers-prevails.
Thus, although abortion is never far from its agenda, it is fair to
observe that the foetal rights movement tackles more than abortion.
In the United States, in the aftermath of the significant yet modest
pro-choice victory in Roe v ITT:ide, the strategy bas been to work
within and against the letter of Roe. While for some, the insistence
that life begins at conception obviously means that there can he no
compromise with Roe, for others the short-term concession of the
first trimester to pregnant women has enabled them to declare
'open season' on the second and the third. The argument is that
once a pregnant woman has foregone her optio11for an early, legal
abortion, her rights as a citizen diminish increasingly in favour of
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her obligations (and, they argue, her legally enforceable duty) to
her foetus. In John Robertson's word s, although a woman is under
'no obligation to invite the fetus- in or to allow it to remain, once
she has done these things, she assumes obligations to the fetus that
limit her freedom over het body '.8S
. Secondly, they are supremely
confident that medical science will soon render the foetus viable at
increasingly earlier points in pregnancy and, that as a result, the
parameters for women to exercise their right to early abortion will
be increasingly narrowed.86 Thus, in the US, right to life advocates
have worked both within and against the letter of the Roe judg ement. As Janet Gallagher has argued:
This attem pt to use Roe as a legal weapon against pregnant
women -to claim it as justifi cation for detention, criminal
charges of 'abuse', drastic restraints on liberty, and even
unconsented-to surgical invasion-stands the decision on its
head, and not merely in terms of the right to abortion. Roe v
Wade may have its flaws, but granting open season on pregnant women after viability is not one of them.87

Paternal Legal Claims: The Abortion I njunction Cases
In this section, I revisit some ground recen tly well travelled by
activists, courts and academics:88 the fathers' rights claims in the
area of abortion. Reviewing the various judic ial victories achieved
by women against the seeming odds of law and patriarchy illustrates that the right of women to abortion unencumbered by the
interference of men is one which principally and paradoxically has
been acknowledged by the law alone. In other words, a woman's
right to autonomy and self-determination in her fertility control is
still a contentious claim within a society committed to the idealized
(patriarchal) nuc.lear family.
Given the great importance placed on t he issue of fathers' rights
by groups opposing th e liberalization of abortion law, it is not surprising that the issue of h.usbands' and fathers' rights in the matter of abortion has been raised in Canada . Indeed, after Marc
Lepine murdered fourteen women at the Ecole Polytechnique in
Montreal in December 1989 and injured a dozen more in his antifeminist rampage, a spokeswoman for REAL Women of Canada
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opined that he 'just might have been a man w hose child had been
aborted by a feminist '.89
There is of cou rse some irony in the concern that anti-choice
groups express on behalf of men who have 'lost their rights' in the
context of legal abortion . Although there has never been an express
requ iremen t for a husband 's consent in abortion law .or medical
procedure, they have not ever really been left out in the cold.9°
Notwith stand ing the absence of any legislative requirement for
either spousal or parental consent in the old abortion provisions,
the Badgley Report found that in practice Therapeutic Abortion
Committees across Canada operated \Vith diverse consent require·
ments relating both to the age of the woman and to the father. More
than two-thirds (68%) of the hospitals surveyed by the Committee
required the consent of the husband. A few hospitals required the
consent of a husband from \vhom the w oman
was separated or
divorced and the consent of the father where the woman had never
been married.91
Despite these practices, under the previous therapeutic provisions of the Criminal Code, Canadian courts had held that a bus·
band had neither a right to be consulted rtor a right of veto in the
matter of his wife's application for a therapeutic abortion.92 They
have been, however, more loath than courts in other jurisdictions93
to rule these men completely out of court. In two early reported
cases, Canadian courts adopted the reasoning of an English court in
Paton v Trustees of B.P.A.S.,94 in which a husband applied unsuccessfully for an injunction to prevent his wife from proceeding
with an abortion approved in accordance with the English abortion
legislation. In 1981, the British Columbia Supreme Court dealt
with an application by a husband for an injunction to restrain his
wife and the Campbell River and District Hospital from proceeding
with her therapeutic abortion.95 The BC cou rt held that the facts
were virtually identical to those in the Paton case and similarly
held that the therapeutic abortion provisions of the Criminal Code
could not accommodate a husban d's 'veto'.
Three years later, an Ontario Court was faced ·ith a similar,
highly publicized application.96 Alexander Medhurst commenced
the action on his behalf and that of his u nborn child for an injunction to restrain his wife, her doctor, and the hospital from pro·
ceeding with an abortion. Al though he was initially successful, the
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court u ltimately held that as an u nborn child is not a person, there
was no legal entity for w hom the husband could be appointed
guardian. Although both husbands were unsuccessful in their legal
challenges, a close reading of these t'vo early cases reveals judicial
angst about abortion, along with considerable sympathy for the
position of the applicant husbands.
The insistence by the women's movement that men take children
and child care seriously has contributed to the now prevalent
assun1ption that men as fathers actually do much more than they
once did. As Carol Smart has illustrated in her work, the image of
new fathers, especially'vith ba bies (as opposed to children) now
informs popular culture.97 Thus it seems inevitable tha t we should
have witnessed an apparent surge in men's interest in 'their pregnancies' and 'their' u nborn child ren and, for some, their struggles
for custody before birth. Another tw ist to the law's relation to and
regulation of women resu rfaced in the aftermath of the Supreme
Court's decision in Morgenaler. Men (supported by the pro-life
movement) once again began to litigate to prevent women from terminating pregnancy. To the women's movement's clarion call that
'This uterus is not government property' , these 'post-Morgentaler'
men responded : 'No, it's mine.' To them, abortion was not a
women's issue; it was their issue about their 'issue'.
The apparent legal vacuum created by the Supreme Court's deci·
sion in 1988 spurred some men to litigious direct action. Consistent
with the pre-Morgentaler cases,98 in all but one of these cases the
men were successful initially. Judges who were confronted with the
application, usually ex parte, were persuad ed to issue the interim
order.99 The respondent woman had to apply to a different judge of
the same court to set aside the initial ex parte restraining order.100
When she lost again, as Chantal Daigle did in the Quebec Court of
Appeal; she had then to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. 101
Only Justice Hirschfield of the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench
of his own initiative (as the womru1 was not represented by counsel
before him) was unequivocal in recogni7ing the woman's right to
choose, although the importance of his caveat should not be lost:
It is apparent to me that when the Respondent decided she
was going to terminate the pregnancy she was exercising a
freedom of choice which she has the right to exercise. And,
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that she was exercising the control over her body which she
has the right to exercise. . . . [the] overwhelming consideration
from my point of view is the fact that a human being, that is
the Respondent has an absolute ri.ght, subject to criminal
sanctions, to the control of her body. There is no criminal
sanction against her exercising that right, in my opinion, as
the law stands today, and until changed , she is entitled to do
so. (emphasis added)IO'Z
In the end, in the post-Morgentaler cases, none of the injunctions
stood. The women won in court; the .men lost.
To refuse to characterize these legal victories in the abortion
struggle as defeats does not absolve one from the req uisi te analysis
of the nature of the victories and their manifest fragility and weakness. Nor is it to deny the fact that they often do not feel like victories, even where the ex pa rte restrai n in g orders are lif ted,
enabling the woman to proceed unencumbered by legal sanction. It
is also important to acknowledge the lack of legal determinacy in
these cases; for instance, in a number of the injunction cases in both
Canada and the United States, the woman proceeded to have an
abortion, notwithstanding the fact that the case was still before the
court.103 In one case where a Britisl1 woman survived the judicial
ordeal wi th her legal rights intact, she elected not to have the abortion and gave the baby to the man, who in tum gave the child to his
mother to raise. 104 And of course, in Canada in the summer of 1989,
the spectacular conversion by Barbara Dodd to the Right to Life
Movement made news for weeks. Ms Dodd's attempt to obtain an
abortion was initially thwarted by her boyfriend, who may or may
not have been the 'father', and his lawyer, Angela Costigan. The prochoice movement champion ed Dodd's cause, and she was eventually
able to proceed with the abortion. Almost immediately following
her successful struggle to resist her boyfriend and proceed with her
abortion, she recanted, and made the cover of Maclean's.105 Legal
victories clearly are not to be taken for real victories.
On.e reason these legal victories often f eel like defeats is the clear
empathy expressed in many of the cases for the men, especially the
husbands, especially by the male judiciary.106 In the early Ontario
case, i\f edhurst, Mr Justice Reid was clearly moved by the husband's plight:
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The husband has a direct interest in the issue of the compliance with the [criminal] law which, in my view, entitles him to
bring this application on his own beha]f, and his lack of any
right to withhold his consent or to be consulted does not
deprive him of the right to resort to this court to assert or protect that interest . I cannot think of anyone more ent itled to
the court's protec tion of that interest than a husband . . . .
[ l]t is diff icult to think of anyone who could have an interest equal to that of a husband in the pr egnancy of his wife.107
(etnphasis added)
Reid J.'s holding permitted the husband to apply immediately to
review the Therapeutic Abortion Committee's decision in the matter of his wife's application for a therapeutic abortion, and although
he 'lost' in that round as well,108 he had been empowered by the
judici al assertion of a h usband's inherent interest and virtua] 'natural right' in respect of his wife's pregnancy. This was so notwithstanding the fact of their marital separation, and the husband's
clear attempt to force his wife back into the marriage. The legal
form of the substantive la'v as it then was inhibited the husband's
power. But the generosity of Canadian courts toward the granting
of standing to men in the matter of abortion, 109 including in the
injw1ction cases under the Criminal Code, makes it clear that any
recriminalizat ion of abortion will invite and facilitate proced11ral
harassment of women seeking abortions and doctors prepared to
perform them.
Not only have men qua men been somewhat inhibited by law; so
too have some American ju dges· who find they 'must, with reluctance' accept that '[t]he [US] Supreme Court has made it crystal
clear that a pregnant woman, without the permission or consent or
advice from anyone else' has a right to an abortion in the first
trimester, while noting that '(m]any individ uals who specialize in
religion or ethical concerns are appalled by the Supreme Court
decisions'.110 In the course of h is reported judg ement in M edhurst,
Reid J. also insisted:
It is not possible to approach this matter without personal
convict ions-I am personally appalled at the prospect of
abortion-or to be left unmoved by the emotion and anxiety
that suffuse th is issue.111

137

In light of his views 'at the prospect of abortion', one imagines that
Mrs Medhurst was relieved that the criminal law inhibited not only
her husband but also the Bench. One doubts that it was her 'emotion and anxiety' that moved the judg e in his remarks.
Not every man who lost in court received condolences from the
bench. The fact of allegations of violence contributin g to the separation (Mr Paton) and/or abortion (Mr Tremblay) was noted (with·
out comm ent) by the tribunals/bench . The men who were trying to
hold marriages together (Medhu rst, And erson,, Whalley) were
regarded as sincere men in tragic circumstances. Significantly, the
failure to conform to the ideal of the sincere family man was fatal
to at least one A merican man's claim. 112 John Doe commenced an
action in Indiana to prevent Jane Smith from proceeding to terminate her 10-12 week pregnancy. He managed to get himself before
a justice of the US Supreme Court within two weeks. Jane Smith
had become pregnant toward the end of their two-month relationship during which time he had been separated from his wife of six
months, by whom he also had a child. He had since reconciled with
his wife. Significantly also for Justice Stevens, John Doe had been
'sporadically employed at low paying jobs for the last eighteen
months'.113
Following an earlier decision of the US Su preme Court in
Planned Parenthood v Danf orth,'11'- Stevens J. noted that in order
to 'require a mother to carry a child to term against her wishes, the
father must demonstrate clear and compelli ng reasons justify ing
such actions.•us Here, inter alia, the plaintiff 'has showed substantial instability in his mental and romantic life. Based upon the
plaintiff s romantic patterns over the last eight months, it would be
impossible for the Court to predict the stability of his family unit
at the time of birth.' 116 Therefore, John Doe's claim was held to
provide a 'particularly weak basis for invoking the extraordinary
jud icial relief sought '.117 Had John Doe been a stable family ma n
wi th a good and steady income, Justice Stevens, it seems, might
have been persuaded to rule differently.
The risk of relying on the characterization of the 'facts' of men
presumably 'suffused by emotion and anxiety' (and indeed their
equally suffused lawyers) in their quests to prevent their estranged
wives or girlfriends from obtaining legal abortions has been illustrated in the 1989 Ontario case Murphy v Dodd.118 Angela Costigan,

138

counsel for the applicant boyfriend, had served the court documents herself upon Barbara Dodd on Friday afternoon before the
July long weekend; the return date was the Tuesday morni ng immediately following the holiday Monday. On Tu esday, the presiding
Judge noted in the endorsement of his order:
The time is 10:40 a.m.; counsel for the Applicant advises me
that she has had indirect commun ication \\ith the Respondent
Dodd; neither Respondent appears nor does Dodd intend to
appear by counsel. No one is here to represent the hospital. 119
In his affidavit in support of the application, Gregory Murphy
deposed that he was the father of the Respondent's unborn child,
that her doctor had said that an abortion wou ld endanger her
health, and that he was from an 'intellectually superior' family.120 In
the subsequent application by Ms Dodd to set aside the initial
ord er, Gregory Murphy's conduct (and by implication his counsel)
was characterized by her counsel as amounting to a fraud upon the
court. In her affidavit, Ms Dodd deposed that another man might
well have been responsible for the pregnancy (this was corroborated
in an affidavit by the other man), and that. this had been 'the only
issue connected'vith her pregnancy that [she and Murphy] fought
about'.121 In their affidavits, both she and her doctor denied that he
had said that the abortion would endanger her health . And finally,
Ms Dodd, supported by expert evidence on her own intellectual
ability and comprehension of the spoken word (she had a 90°/o
hearing loss), was able to demonstrate that Mu rph y's lawyer (in her
d irect commu nication during service of the documents) had not
explained the nature of the documents served. A& a result, the ex
parte order restraining Barbara Dodd from proceeding with the
abortion was set aside, having been obtained by a fraud upon the
court, fraud held to be related to material issues.122
In the abortion inj u nction cases, many of the ju dges have
accepted the men 's self-descriptions as 'fathers' of the 'unborn'
{infan t plaintiff, child). In its judgement in Tremblay v Daigle the
Supreme Court of Canada pointedly reminded Canadians that these
men are more accurately characterized as 'potential fathers'.123 However, the answer to the question 'what makes a man a father?'
seems not to lend itself to such appeals to reason. The Supreme
Court rnay proclaim this to the 'amens' of every feminist in the

139

country, and yet in the very real \\'orld there is fear that ideologically and culturally, the hearts and minds of many Canadians seem
to be with the men, the 'fathers' who are losing to selfish women
and their feminist allies.124
Feminist sociologist Barbara Katz Rothman 125 argues that North
.American society, and its legal system, have pri vileged biological
paternity over social fathering, where pregnancy is seen as something a tnan 'does' to a woman, by planting 'his' seed in her, where
she has 'his' children. Rothman urges a ret hinking of fathering, one
which de-emphasizes the 'genetic connection' and re-emphasizes
the social relationship. Iremain unconvinced that a man can 'forge'
a relationship 'vith a foetus, or that he can have his own 'experience' of abortion.126 The foetus is intimately connected to and constructed within t he woman's body; it can only be intimately
con.nected to and constructed within the imagination of the man.
Despite his early (and u ndeniably pivotal) contribution to a
woman's pregnancy, it can never be his pregnancy. His relationship
with the foetus, if there is to be one, is inevitably mediated by the
pregnant woman, and increasingly as well by law.
The resistance we witness to the recent judic ial pronouncements
inhibiting men may illustrate what Michael Mandel has characterized
as understandable resistance to the undemocratic nature of the 'judicial fiat'.127 And yet, the champions of the resistance in this instance
(for example, REAL Women of Canada) are themselves less than committed to the democratic process, much less the 'rule of law'. It is
clear that they will continue to work in, against, and outside the law
to restrict women's access to abortion.
The abortion injuncti on cases and anti-feminist response remind
us of the urgency of Smart's challenge to take up alternative, extralegal strategies to defend and extend women's reproductive freedom.
Women may have won in court, hut the real struggle contin ues, and
real victories remain to be won.

Clawbacks: The Provinces Respond
Perhaps the most striking response to the Morgentaler decision is
to be found in the provincial governments' reactions to the spectre
of decriminalized abortion in combination with the promise of Dr
Morgentaler to establish clinics in every province. As others have
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noted, 128 the Supreme Court's decision was less than facilitative of
women's access to abortion. The Court had simply struck down one
form of legal prohibition. The provincial governments of Quebec
and Ontario indicated that they would continue to insure abortions under provincial medical insu rance plans. However, several
provinces quickly set to work erecting local barriers to access.
It is worth remembering that the 1969 reform had also been the
subject of political agitation and legal challenge in some provincial
legislatures prior to 1988. The nature of these early provincial
initiatives, and their ultimate fate, both foreshadowed the postMorgentaler activity and brought into sharp relief a tremendous
contradiction. One concrete example will illustrate. In 1985, an
anti-choice Conservative backbencher in the Saskatchewan legislature in troduced a private member's bill that would have required a
Therapeutic Abortion Committee to secure the 'inf ormed consent'
of the patient and spousal or parental consent.129 In addition, the bill
would have imposed a 48-hour waiting period after consent had been
given before the procedure could be performed.130 In a surprise
move, the provincial cabinet referred the bill to the Court of Appeal
follo,ving second reading. The Saskatche,van Court of Appeal ruled
that the proposed legislation was ultra vires the province, as it was
criminal law, and hence within federal jurisdiction.131 Otherwise, the
Conservative majority in the provincial legislature would have passed
this bill, which at least temporarily would have become provincial
law. This early Saskatchewan case foreshadowed the debate that
ensued in the aftermath of the M orgentaler decision. It also illuminated an interesting paradox: the criminal denotation of abortion
inhibited some forms of provincial restrictions.
Following the Supreme Court's decision in January 1988, no premier moved more quickly than did Bill Vander Zalm of British
Columbia. Vander Zalm announced that BC would not pay the costs
of abortions; although he pledged that nobody would be permitted
to die, he insisted, 'rape and incest are not life threatening. . . . We
mil not be funding abortions.'1:fl While Vander Zalm's brash, unilateral initiative did not withstand judicial scrutiny,133 other
provi nces, like Alberta, worked more quietly to ensure that decriminalization did not tnean liberalizat ion. l34 Alberta had already
experimented with 'de-insuring' certain medical services. In 1987,
tubal ligation, mid-tubal reconstruction, vasectomy, and gastroplasty
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procedures had been de-insured by the provincial government.13.5
Following the Morgentaler decision, the Alberta Minister of Health
announced that provincial health insu rance would pay only for
abortions approved by hospital therapeutic abortion committees.136
The province subsequently modified its position and issued regu·
lations which allowed an abortion to he insured if the doctor performing it had first secured a second opinion. Beyond this, Ian
Urquhart suggests that the modest fee allowed under Alberta health
insurance for therapeutic abortions has operated as a financial disincentive to abortion, and he concludes:
in the aftermath of Morgentaler, the Alberta government has
used the province's health insurance program as a vehicle for
preservin g the essence of the situation existing prior to
Court's decision. Ty ing health insurance coverage to the performance of abortions in approved hospitals only after a second opinion has been offered, as well as retaining the modest
fee schedule, combine to restrict access to this procedure,
especially for women of modest means.t37
The fate of a similar initiative by the New Brunswick government
is of in terest. In the spring of 1989, Dr Morgentaler once again
found himself in court; on this occasion he was a plaintiff, and the
government of New Brunswick was the defendant. Morgentaler was
tr} ng to extract his fees from the New Brunswick medicare system
for abortions performed on three New Bruns'\\-ick women in his
Montreal clinic in the spring of 1988. The provincial government
had declined to reimburse him, qiting provincial policy that had
been issued following the Suprem e Court 's decision: New
Brunswick defined an 'entitled service' as one for which two physicians had certified its medical necessity, and the procedure had to
be performed by a specialist in an approved hospital. 138 These criteria applied to abortions performed outside the province of New
Brunswick as well. As in the BC Civil Liberties case, the Court
essentially found that the New Brunswick government had acted
precipitously; the 'policy' had not been formally adopted as a regulation under the provincial legislation. As there was no statutory
basis for the requirements that the province had attem pted to
impose, Dr Morgentaler obtained the court order he was seeking, a
declaration that the policy of the government of New Brunswick
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was invalid with respect to abortions perf ormed outside the
province of New Brunswick. 139 Despite the absence of a statutory
basis for the policy, the court did n ot extend the declaration to
abortions performed withinNew Bru nswick. As a
result of this
decision, New Bru nswick doctors and New Brunswick women
u nable to leave the province continued to be caught by the policy.
No government resisted the implications of Dr Morgentaler's
Supreme Court victory more tenaciously than did John Buchanan's
Conservative government in Nova Scotia. Just as the Nova &otia
governmen t defied the Supreme Cou rt ruling, so too did Dr Morgentaler defy in characteristic fashion the Nova Scotia legislation. In
the spring of 1989, the provincial Minister of Health annou n ced in
the legislature that 'it is not the policy of this government to
endorse or support in any way the provision of [abortion] services
through free-standing clinics'14-0 when he introduced the bill that
would eventually become the Medical Services Act S.N.S., c. 9 and
regulations under it. The stated purpose of the Act set out in s. 2
was: 'to prohibit the privatization of the provision of certain medical services in order to maintain a single high-quality health-care
delivery system for all Nova Scotias [sic]'.141
A number of medical services were required under the Act to be
performed in an approved hospita l: arthoscopy, colonoscopy, upper
gastro-intestinal endoscopy, abortion, lithotripsy, liposuction,
nuclear medicine, installation or removal of intraocular lenses, and
electromyography.142 The Medical Services Act provided that there
would be no reimbu rsement to any person 'vbo perfor med or
received a designated medical service in contravent ion of the Act,
and (S.6) that anyone who contravened the Act was guilty of an
offence and liable upon summary conviction to a fine of not less
than $10,000.00 and not more than $50,000.00.
Dr Morgentaler defied the Act and was charged after he performed abortions at his Halifax clinic. He was ordered by the
Supreme Court of Nova &otia not to perfo.rm abortions u ntil the
charges against him were heard.143 Following his trial in the spring
of 1990, the charges against him were dismissed by Provincial
Court Judge Ken nedy on the ground that the Nova Scotia legislation was really criminal law, and hence beyond the legislative jurisdiction of the province.144
The Crown 's appeal to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal was
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unsuccessful. Freeman J.A. framed the question before the court:
The question is not whether Nova Scotia possesses legislative
powers to pass a law in the form of the Medical Services Act.
It clearly could have done so, even though it dealt with abortion. The question is whether the province properly used
those powers and created a law within the. provincial compe·
tence, or whether it improperly attempted to use federal powers to pass a law that, regardless of its form, is actually a
criminal law. Onlyif it bears the u nmistakable imprint of
criminal law must it be struck down. 145
It was Morgentaler's position that the Act and Regulation were
an incursion by a province into the field of criminal law, that it was
'criminal law in the guise of hospital law'.146 The Crown's position
was the Act WilS 'about privatization' 147 -essentially an attempt by
the Conservatives to defend medicare against the incursions of the
private sector. Freeman agreed that, 'examined uncritically and
within its own four corners', the Medical Services Act appeared to he
no more than a piece of legislation dealing with provincial hospitals.148 Ho'\\•ever, a more critical and contextual examination of the
Act, its purpose and effect, its nature and character, led the majority
of the Court of AppE>
..al to conclude that it was .,;, rtually identical to
the Criminal Code provisions that had been struck down in M orgentaler.149 Despite the apparent breadth and neutrality of the provisions, the Court found that the real focus of the legislation was
Henry Morgentaler and its primary thrust was to prohibit his abortion clinics. Even the fines provided in the Act had been 'tailored to
the [provincial] Department of Health's estimate of his resources'.150
Once again Morgentaler had successfully challenged a piece of
abortion legislation, this time 'defending' the federal criminal law
power. The irony of this position, necessitated as it was by the clawback of the province and the exigencies of litigation, should not be
lost. Perhaps more than anything else, it illustrates the inevitable
compromises that engagement with the legal process involves. The
constraints irnposed by the litigation and judici al processes lead to
legal victories that are unreconcilable politically.The constraints go
further, because the political imagination inevitably yields the pragmatism of the legal shrug: What else could be argued? How else
could he win?
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The indeterminacy of the M orgentaler decision was not
inevitable. The Canadian feminist and pro-choice movement made
history, but not under condit ions of their own choosing. The cynicism and mean-spiritedness of assorted conservative governments,
and their commitment to erosion of even the modest social programs ir1 place, meant that the legal victory of Morgentaler was just
that, and no n1ore. The struggle for choice, for change, had to continue. Once again, Canadian women found they could claim 'no
easy victories'.151

Conclusiori
The entrenchment of medical control of abortion has been identi·
fied as fundmentally implicated in ensu rin g the continued subordination of women. 152 For its part, the pro-life movement argues that
there is no medical justification for abortion and is more than a little suspicious of what it sees as 'medical opportunists' who profit
from a 'murderous industry' and who are in effect accomplices of
women in abortion.1$3 Thus the merits of medical determination are
explicitly challenged by both feminists, who have identified the
moral arbitration embedded in medical practice, and right -to-life
advocates.
Although 1have argu ed elsewhere that both the criminalization
of abortion and the implications of the therapeutic exception had to
be un derstood and challenged, I have also argued that the notion of
abortion as a medical matter has facilitated the formal erosion of
one form of patriarchal auhority.The 1\-Iorgentaler decision pushes
this issue a bi t further, because women have pointed to the spirit
and letter of the Canada Health Act to legitimate demands for
state-funded access to abortion as a health-care service. To be colloquial, it may be that we have been released for the moment from
the 'criminal' frying pan only to be burned by the 'health-care' fire.
Nevertheless, as we consider the litan y of struggles to resist the
recriminalization of abortion, it will continue to be critical for feminists, activists and academics together, to explore and expand the
social right to health care envisioned by the early advocates of
co1nprehensive health care.
An important, related question is whether all law is necessarily
bad. Put another way, it is certainly critically important in my
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view for feminists to resist any recriminalization of abortion at any
stage of pregnancy. However, it is now worth considering whether a
positive, affirmative right to abortion ought to be advocated, either
by way of amendment to the federal Canada flealth Act and/or
provincial health legislation. The absence of criminal law did not
guarantee ipsofacto a right of access to safe abortion, as the developments after January 1988 illustrate. Indeed, the tone and language of t he Supreme Cou rt judg ements invited some of the
ensuing provincial responses: to wit, 'if it's a private ma tter, we
don't have to pay for it.' The creation of a positive, legally enforceable right through the health-care system might render more public, and perhaps more political, the legitimate rights and desires of
Canadian women.
It is one of the great paradoxes in the Canad ian context that the
issue of women's reproductive freedom, including access to abortion, was long dominated by two men of opposing points of view:
Henry Morgentaler and Joseph Borowski. Moreover, as Rosalind
Petchesky has brilliantl y illuminated, the image!')' of the foetal personhood campaign attempts to render women invisible.154 But
women have not acquiesced to invisibility, as Chan tal Daigle
demonstrated in the summer of 1989 when she resisted her exlover, the pro-life movement, her Jawyer, and the courts. Chantal
Daigle reminded us that women's individual and collective struggles
for choice and self-determination may have been constrained, but
have never been wholly confined nor determined by the legal and
judicial processes.
So too, the struggle for decriminalization and for safe, universally
accessible abortion is both an individual and collective one. One is
not possible without the other.
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